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SECULAR STATES AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, by Bruce J. 
Berman, Rajeev Bhargava & André Laliberté (eds)1
SECULAR STATES AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY contributes to the emerging field of 
“contextual secularism,” which challenges a one-size-fits-all approach to the secular 
state by acknowledging that secularism takes different forms in various societies. 
Contextual secularism, this volume suggests, is a “multivalue doctrine [whose] 
constitutive values do not always sit easily with one another but are frequently in 
conflict.”2 Consequently, the secular state will differ in each setting and according 
to local dynamics. Secular States and Religious Diversity examines the secularist 
discourses outside of the “Eurocentric” debates that have dominated this field 
until now. This collection of essays on secularism—in all its forms—generates a 
heightened academic sensitivity to both global and local differences. Edited by 
Bruce J. Berman (Professor Emeritus of Political Studies at Queen’s University), 
Rajeev Bhargava (Senior Fellow and Director of the Centre for the Study of 
Developing Studies in New Delhi), and André Laliberté (Professor of Political 
Studies at the University of Ottawa), this volume represents the culmination of a 
conversation initiated at a conference on the secular state and religious diversity 
held by the Ethnicity and Democratic Governance program at the University 
of Ottawa in 2008. At this conference, a new generation of political scientists 
was reunited with distinguished scholars of religious studies: the result is a deep 
1. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013) 334 pages.
2. Bruce J Berman, Rajeev Bhargava & André Laliberté, “Introduction” in supra note 1 at 16.
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conversation on how “increasing religious diversity compels the secular state to 
rethink its purpose and its position relative to religion.”3
The tensions and questions posed by this volume have been highlighted 
in many recent examples, which strengthen the editors’ claim that the state 
needs to reconsider its relationship to religion. France’s Act No. 2010-1192,4 
which prohibits the concealment of one’s face in public places—and thus 
bans the wearing of burqas and niqabs in public places (without ever naming 
these garments or their ethnic/religious provenance)—has been found to have 
a legitimate aim by the European Court of Human Rights.5 According to the 
Court, such a legislated ban is justifiable since it seeks to guarantee the conditions 
of vivre ensemble or “living together.”6 Indeed, constructing the state’s obligation 
as one of social cohesion also suggests that a wide margin of appreciation is an 
appropriate response when managing religious diversity at the supranational level. 
Quebec’s Charter of Secular Values7 (as it was known) represents another 
example that challenges the state’s relationship to religion. Introduced by the 
Parti Québécois (PQ) in 2013, the Charter of Secular Values found its untimely 
demise in the PQ’s electoral defeat in April 2014. Nevertheless, this far-reaching 
bill promised to change the legal landscape in Quebec, from enshrining religious 
neutrality and the secular nature of the state into Quebec’s Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms,8 to compelling public bodies to adopt a stance of religious 
neutrality, to revising rules related to religious dietary concerns in daycares, not to 
mention prohibiting all conspicuous symbols revealing religious affiliation worn 
by public officials.9 Individuals who refused to remove such conspicuous symbols 
3. Ibid at 7.
4. Loi n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public, 
JO (11 April 2011).
5. SAS v France [GC], No 43835/11 (1 July 2014).
6. Ibid at paras 141-42.
7. Bill 60, Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality 
between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests, 1st Sess, 40th 
Leg, Quebec, 2013 [Charter of Secular Values].
8. RSQ c C-12.
9. Charter of Secular Values, supra note 8, ss 3-6, 30.(3), 40, 41. A pictogram was also released 
during the PQ’s campaign in favour of the Charter of Secular Values, illustrating permitted 
and prohibited (or conspicuous) religious symbols. See Un État neutre au service de tous 
(pictogram), online: <http://wpmedia.o.canada.com/2013/09/poster.jpg>.
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would have to engage in dialogue (initiated by the employer) “in order to remind 
[them] of their obligations and foster their compliance.”10 
While many more illustrations can be referenced to buttress the relevance 
and timeliness of the book,11 the French and Québécois examples speak to the 
“construction” of a secular state, the complexity of negotiating one’s “secular 
identity,” the potential entrenchment of a two-tier system of justice (not to 
mention access to justice) for citizens and “others,” as well as challenges related 
to the vestiges of colonialism, growing religious/racial/ethnic diversity, and 
majority-minority group relations. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued—as does this volume—that the French 
and Québécois examples employed here to illustrate the complexity of the 
“secular state” also reify the existing discourse on the West’s dominance of the 
secularist debate. The authors of this collection seek to address the challenges 
faced by state secularism in other settings, such as India, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Lebanon, as well as the growing pains in moving beyond the existing model of 
state secularism (as discussed in Paul Bramadat and David Seljak’s chapter,12 
for example). Secular States and Religious Diversity addresses these issues with 
relative aplomb, yet exemplifies the complexities and challenges of engaging with 
varying secularist models.
This edited collection’s contributions to broad themes of contextualism and 
governance point to what is really at stake in this volume. First, the authors 
10. Charter of Secular Values, supra note 8, s 14. Pursuant to this section, refusal to comply 
after dialogue could result in disciplinary measures, which could include termination of 
employment. Paradoxically, the crucifix that hangs prominently in Quebec’s National 
Assembly was understood to be of patrimonial, rather than of religious, value and was 
considered outside of the scope of the Charter of Secular Values, not to mention the state’s 
obligation, as a public body, to uphold religious neutrality. See Jean-Marc Salvet, “Charte des 
valeurs: le sort du crucifix ne sera pas décidé par la loi,” La Presse (6 November 2013) online: 
<http://www.lapresse.ca/le-soleil/actualites/politique/201311/05/01-4707653-charte-des-
valeurs-le-sort-du-crucifix-ne-sera-pas-decide-par-la-loi.php>. Salvet suggests that since the 
crucifix was not brought into the National Assembly by law, it would not go out through one 
either. 
11. See e.g. Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc, 134 S Ct 2751 (2014), 82 USLW 4636 (USSC); 
Eweida v United Kingdom, No 48420/10, [2013] ECHR 37; Lautsi v Italy, No 30814/06, 
[2009] ECHR 1901; Cass Ass plén, 25 June 2014, No 612; Erazo v Dufferin-Peel Catholic 
District School Board, 2014 ONSC 2072, 119 OR (3d) 347; Loyola High School v Quebec 
(AG), 2012 QCCA 2139, 46 Admin LR (5th) 79, leave to appeal to SCC granted, 35201 
(13 June 2013) (appeal heard on 24 March 2014; judgment reserved); Mouvement laïque 
québécois v Saguenay (City of ), 2013 QCCA 936, 363 DLR (4th) 62, leave to appeal to SCC 
granted, 35496 (16 January 2014) (appeal heard on 14 November 2014; judgment reserved).
12. “Between Secularism and Postsecularism: A Canadian Interregnum” in supra note 1, 97. 
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suggest that not enough attention is paid to the origins of the relationship 
between the secular state and religious institutions. Second, secularist governance 
can take many forms. As a result, it is imperative to look beyond the “staples” of 
secularism—notably France, Turkey, and the United States—and turn our gaze 
to other models of secularism. More particularly, this volume also represents an 
important Canadian contribution to the broader discussion on secularism.
This book’s objective, as stated in the editors’ introductory essay, is to broaden 
the scope of inquiry into the secular state and religious diversity to encompass 
“contextual secularism.” Stated differently, “contextual secularism” refers to a 
relationship of variable geometry among secularism, process (i.e., institutional 
design), and meaning (i.e., religious communities).13 As such, secularism is 
context-specific.
The book is split into three parts, totalling thirteen essays. Part one, 
titled “Historical and Theoretical Approaches,” seeks to destabilize long-held 
assumptions about secularism and religious diversity. 
Peter Beyer, in chapter one,14 argues that religious diversity is not a recent 
notion:
What is new, however, is the connotation that very often accompanies reference to 
religious diversity, namely that there is something inherently problematic about this 
diversity or at least that what is most significant about religion in today’s world is 
its inherent diversity.15 
If religious diversity is not a new phenomenon, as Beyer discusses, it becomes a 
question of institutional design and “whether what we call religion is really any more 
irrational – as opposed to differently rational – than any other human endeavour.”16 
Moreover, if religious diversity is not a new phenomenon, then, according to 
Berman, the reference points in religious communities have changed. He argues, 
in chapter two,17 that in pluralistic secular societies, as a result of the authority 
13. In his chapter, Berman discusses contextual secularism and suggests that it has three 
consequences: 
constitutive values are always potentially in conflict, a level of internal discord and instability 
is inevitable in the democratic process, and issues are settled on a case-by-case basis, where the 
outcomes are not wholly satisfactory to either party but are reasonable to both.
 See Bruce Berman, “Secular Modernity, Religion, and the Politics of Knowledge” in supra 
note 1, 45 at 57.
14. “Religious Pluralism as a Self-Evident Problem in the Context of Globalization” in supra note 
1, 29.
15. Ibid at 40. 
16. Ibid at 43.
17. Berman, supra note 14.
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of science and other forms of expertise, expert knowledge no longer resides only 
in the religious communities.18 This shift in religious communities “reflects less 
a growing religiosity than a response to a social crisis and a perceived threat to 
religious institutions from secular modernity.”19 
Finally, if religious diversity and secularism are not new concepts, then 
perhaps, as proposed by Bhargava in chapter three,20 it is necessary to look outside 
of the usual scope of secular interest—i.e., Western models—to appreciate 
secularism “as a critical perspective that is not against religion but against religious 
homogenization and institutionalized religious domination.”21 Bhargava presents 
Indian secularism not only as an alternative conception of secularist models, but 
also as an illustration of contextual secularism, since it rests on the premise of 
“principled distance.” Bhargava explains the latter as “allow[ing] a practice that 
is banned or regulated in the majority culture to be permitted in the minority 
culture because of the distinctive status and meaning it has for the minority 
culture’s members.”22 Indeed, while Berman’s and Bhargava’s arguments about 
contextual secularism coincide on the subject of relational implications and local 
differences, Bhargava maintains that “internal discord” and instability are also 
part of this model.23 
Part two, entitled “Secularisms in the West,” challenges the assumptions that 
undergird institutional (secular) arrangements regarding religious diversity. Four 
types of assumptions are addressed by the authors in part two: (i) those relating 
to the institutional model employed; (ii) those following from the discursive 
language used; (iii) those concerning the role of local communities in shaping 
these narratives about belonging and difference; and (iv) those relating to the 
values of “secular” state institutions. 
Bramadat and Seljak cautiously argue in their chapter that “it is possible 
that Canada may well have outgrown the current ‘secular’ – or more accurately, 
‘secularist’ – arrangement,”24 since the Canadian population has diversified 
beyond its initial colonizing populations. The authors have termed this transition 
an “ideological interregnum.”25 This period of political transition should also, 
according to the authors, serve to develop a new manner in which intersecting 
18. Ibid at 53.
19. Ibid at 46.
20. “Can Secularism be Rehabilitated?” in supra note 1, 69. 
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid at 86.
23. Ibid at 87.
24. Bramadat & Seljak, supra note 13 at 98.
25. Ibid at 113.
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identities are addressed in the public sphere. The authors place particular emphasis 
on ethnic identity in this discussion. More broadly, Bramadat and Seljak’s chapter 
invites a reinterpretation of how national identities are shaped, and by whom. 
The shaping of narrative is also addressed by Lori G. Beaman, who examines 
the actual language employed—i.e., that of tolerance and accommodation—to 
discuss how we address religious diversity. She argues that this language carries 
socio-cultural colonial (and by extension, imperialist) baggage, making it 
impossible to attain equality among members of society.26 “Accommodation” 
and “tolerance” are predicated on a host/guest mentality and therefore reinforce 
“othering.”27 Beaman argues that attaining equality is not simply a question of 
“dismantling” these concepts, but one of introducing an approach based on deep 
equality (i.e., substantive equality), which rests on William E. Connolly’s notion 
of “deep pluralism.”28 Reshaping the narrative, as contended by Beaman, would 
result in a new normative standard for addressing religious diversity. 
Yasmeen Abu-Laban and Claude Couture argue, in their chapter,29 that 
important distinctions need to be made between American and Canadian 
conceptions of the relationship between secularism and religion. According to 
these authors, America’s “uniqueness” is founded on a “problematic reliance on 
individualism as an explanation, with individualism presented in a confusing 
manner.”30 Faith in the individual in the face of religion creates an awkward 
metanarrative, which obscures the important role that local communities play 
in this relationship. Just as Beaman seeks to dismantle the concepts of tolerance 
and accommodation in her chapter, Abu-Laban and Couture seek to decouple 
Canada and the United States in this discussion on the place of religion and the 
power of local communities in shaping these narratives. 
A last challenge to secularism in the West comes from Ahmet T. Kuru, who 
argues in his chapter that “courts and parliaments act as carriers of ideological 
preferences and strategies rather than as value-free representatives of the neutral 
state or law.”31 Through the lens of the relationship between the secular state and 
religious freedom, Kuru employs the terms “assertive” secularism and “passive” 
26. “Tolerance and Accommodation as Vestiges of the Empire” in supra note 1, 120.
27. Ibid at 122-23.
28. Ibid at 130; William E Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005).
29. “In God We Trust? Secular States, Diversity, and the ‘Clash’ within North America” in supra 
note 1, 136.
30. Ibid at 139.
31. “Ideologies, Institutions, and Laws: Religious Freedom in Secular States” in supra note 1, 165 
at 165.
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secularism.32 Whereas the United States represents a case of passive secularism, 
which “allow[s] public visibility of religion,” France exemplifies assertive 
secularism, which “requires the state to play an ‘assertive’ role in excluding 
religion from the public sphere and confining it to the private domain.”33 The 
Turkish model serves here as an apt illustration of the change in ideological winds 
with regard to the place of religious freedom in the secular state. The model also 
illustrates how state institutions have jockeyed for the position of being entrusted 
with the protection of secularism in the face of religious freedom.34 
Finally, part three of the book, called “Secularisms beyond the West,” 
engages with nonconforming models of secularism through four case studies. 
“Nonconforming” is used here not as a pejorative, but rather as a challenge to 
the secularist models in the West (i.e., the trio of France, Turkey, and the United 
States). Nonconforming models generate unique forms of secularism in the face 
of various forms of religious diversity.
Rinku Lamba, in his chapter,35 employs the political thought of Bhimrao 
Ramji Ambedkar to examine how Hinduism—which Ambedkar considered to 
be a “religion of rules”36—precludes the full realization of individuals’ democratic 
freedom in India because it maintains the social hierarchy embedded in the caste 
system. Yet, the Indian Constitution enables state intervention in religion since 
it prohibits the practice of “untouchability.”37 More broadly, Lamba’s analysis of 
Ambedkar’s political thought underscores how religion, like law and government, 
can exercise social control and shape civil society. Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that religiosity can be articulated in different forms: while it is enshrined 
in some state models (such as India), it is not in others (Taiwan, for example). 
Laliberté, in his chapter,38 emphasizes that East Asian countries provide 
an important counter-discourse to the Western secular state model because 
religiosity is not always expressed in an institutional form in those countries.39 
The case of Taiwan, Laliberté contends, illustrates that the line between state and 
religion is more fluid than one would first assume and that religious diversity can 
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid at 174-79.
35. “State Intervention in the Reform of a ‘Religion of Rules’: An Analysis of the Views of B.R. 
Ambedkar” in supra note 1, 187.
36. Ibid at 188.
37. Ibid at 187.
38. “Something Got Lost in Translation: From ‘Secularism’ to ‘Separation between Politics and 
Religion’ in Taiwan” in supra note 1, 207.
39. Ibid at 214.
(2014) 52 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL328
be handled in diverse settings, independently of political regime. For him, “[t]he 
Taiwanese situation demonstrates that culture is not destiny.”40 
Yet the issue of identity construction returns to the fore in Manuel Litalien’s 
chapter on Thailand,41 in which he argues that the “Thai nation” (based on 
common religion, lineage, and language) still dominates the institutional 
discourse in Thailand.42 Control over the Buddhist clergy and the Muslim 
religious communities in the south of Thailand was accomplished through 
legislative acts and decrees that maintained state jurisdiction over these 
populations during the first half of the twentieth century.43 The current Thai 
Constitution favors the accommodation of religious diversity rather than the 
protection of freedom of religion. According to Litalien, this preference enables 
Buddhism to retain a privileged position in Thai society and, by extension, the 
Buddhist king to retain legitimacy and authenticity in the face of an increasingly 
volatile political environment. 
These two concepts—legitimacy and authenticity—can also be at the 
root of a socio-political impasse, as illustrated in Elinor Bray-Collins’s chapter 
on Lebanon’s consociational system,44 thereby entrenching the distribution of 
power amongst recognized religious communities. Bray-Collins underscores 
the paradoxical nature of the consociational agreements, which were supposed 
to be temporary political arrangements and instead have become Lebanon’s 
institutional backbone. She argues that “in providing these protective guarantees 
to its eighteen religious communities, the Lebanese state ends up sacrificing 
the rights of its citizens who desire secular lives and offering them the least 
protection.”45 Bray-Collins suggests that the consociational agreements make it 
particularly difficult for what she has termed “a young, postwar generation of 
multiconfessional activists”46 and employs the case of civil marriage and student 
activism to buttress her argument. Bray-Collins notes, however, that Lebanon 
does not fit into the secularist typology proposed at the outset of the book 
because the state is divided both formally and informally between the recognized 
religious communities.47 
40. Ibid at 228.
41. “The Changing State Monopoly on Religion and Secular Views in Thailand” in supra note 1, 232.
42. Ibid at 236.
43. Ibid at 238-39.
44. “State-Society Structures and the Frustration of Movements for Secular Reforms in Lebanon: 
Civil Marriage and Youth Activism” in supra note 1, 265.
45. Ibid at 266.
46. Ibid at 265.
47. Ibid at 286-87.
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In the concluding essay, Anna Drake suggests that there is much riding on 
this volume’s focus on secularism. Most strikingly, however, Drake asks readers to 
pause and take a deeper look at secularism (and its limitations) before discarding 
it as a model of relations between the state and religious diversity to move to 
a post-secular state arrangement.48 Drake’s request intimates that an imperfect 
model should not be synonymous with failure but, rather, should be seen as an 
invitation to better engage with our current institutional model.
Secular States and Religious Diversity emphasizes the importance of locating 
religion in society and fits into a larger discussion on secularism. Although the 
book’s editors argue that their contribution to this discussion is to look beyond 
the Western conception of secularism, I consider that the discussion of what 
secularism means in the context of Canadian religious diversity is truly central 
and critical to the book and represents a distinctive contribution to this rapidly 
expanding field.49 Moreover, grasping the complexities and incoherencies of the 
Canadian context makes it possible to turn “the gaze back on itself ”50 in order to 
gain a better understanding of our own ideological (and I would add political/
legal) assumptions about secularism and religious diversity before engaging in an 
analysis of other state secular arrangements. 
The conclusions reached about religious diversity and the secular state in 
Canada can be interpreted as a heuristic to explore other cases of secularism 
beyond the West. First, political arrangements and terms employed in relation to 
religious diversity are not value-neutral, but, rather, carriers of values (as can be 
seen in chapters four, five, seven, ten, and eleven). Secondly, religious diversity is 
not a new phenomenon (as chapters one, three, and nine point out). In bringing 
nonconforming models of state secularism to the fore, Secular States and Religious 
Diversity also rethinks how state secularism is framed, and according to which 
factors. The result is varied, with explanations owed to colonialism, imperialism, 
and historical compromise. What emerges most importantly from secularisms 
outside the West is that no uniform picture of expectations for the state exists. 
48. “Conclusion: Secularism, Religious Diversity, and Democratic Politics” in supra note 1, 293 
at 294-95.
49. It would be remiss of the reviewer not to highlight that Beaman, Beyer, and Laliberté have 
also contributed to another volume in this regard. See Winnifred Fallers Sullivan & Lori G 
Beaman, eds, Varieties of Religious Establishment (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2013). That volume, 
however, is socio-legal in nature, in contrast to the political science and religious studies focus 
of Secular States and Religious Diversity.
50. Brenda Cossman, “Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal 
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project” (1997) 2 Utah L Rev 525 at 527.
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Religious diversity in this setting is similarly challenged, as is its articulation to 
the state apparatus (e.g., Laliberté’s chapter on Taiwan). 
On a critical note, three modest comments can be offered. First, the volume 
seeks to explore contextual secularism “even when the authors do not use this 
terminology explicitly.”51 Beyond Bhargava’s in-depth discussion of contextual 
secularism in the Indian context, the introductory essay and Berman’s chapter 
offer the only other explicit discussions of this perspective on secularism. The 
reader can glean more from the case studies in terms of the contextual (or 
variable) relationships that can exist between the various religious communities 
and the secular state, such as how the state tries to break down caste barriers in 
India, thereby intervening in how Hinduism is practiced, or the reassertion of a 
Buddhist role in Thailand via formal/informal channels. Nevertheless, more work 
could have been done to present a coherent account of the theory and practice 
surrounding contextual secularism. This is particularly noticeable in relation to 
the nonconforming case studies. 
Second, Abu-Laban and Couture’s argument aimed at destabilizing a 
metanarrative on the “West” (i.e., the United States) as an epicentre of modernity 
seems to hide what I consider to be their more interesting argument about the role 
of the local communities in shaping these discourses around religious diversity. 
Third, the essays in part three appear uneven in terms of format. Whereas 
Laliberté, Litalien, and Bray-Collins engage with secularisms beyond the West in 
the form of case studies, Lamba’s essay relies heavily on B.R. Ambedkar’s political 
thought to discuss constitutional reforms to Hinduism in India, appearing 
very descriptive at times. That said, Bray-Collins’s thoughtful case study of the 
consociational system in Lebanon and the difficulties of achieving any secular 
reform stands out, highlighting the very challenges that this book raises, and the 
impossibility of developing a perfect typology of secularist models.52 
Secular States and Religious Diversity is in a similar vein to the works of 
Linell E. Cady and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd;53 Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal 
S. Mandair;54 and Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, and Jonathan 
VanAntwerpen.55 Their three respective books participate, in their own way, in 
a deconstruction of the secular debate to address multiple forms of secularism. 
Dressler and Mandair’s volume, as noted by Jeffrey Haynes, proposes that “the 
51. Berman, Bhargava & Laliberté, supra note 3 at 23.
52. Bray-Collins, supra note 45 at 286-87.
53. Eds, Comparative Secularisms in a Global Age (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).
54. Eds, Secularism and Religion-Making (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
55. Eds, Rethinking Secularism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
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formation and development of ‘religion’ in both the West and former Western 
colonies is a highly politicized process, leading to the universalization of a generic 
term ‘religion’, which is very different, forever set aside, from non-religion (that 
is, secularity).”56
Cady and Hurd’s volume, on the other hand, distinguishes itself by its deep 
comparative study of secularisms in France, Turkey, India, and the United States, 
arguing that “various modes of secularism provide different spaces for religion, 
with the latter understood to be plural in form and always internally contested.”57 
Finally, unlike Calhoun, Juergenmeyer, and VanAntwerpen’s book, whose essays 
have been described as predominantly “proceed[ing] from the terms set by the 
history of the secular in the West,”58 Secular States and Religious Diversity benefits 
from non-Western forms of secularism to provide a thicker understanding of 
multiple secularisms. 
Secular States and Religious Diversity accentuates the complexities of 
secularism’s empire. It is a timely and relevant book, which at once adds to the 
theoretical debates surrounding secularisms, engages in a deeper conversation 
about the particularities of how religious diversity is addressed in Canada, and 
provides important case studies beyond the West. All of this helps to bolster 
the argument that, if not urgently, at least sometime soon, states will need to 
reconsider their relationship to religion.
56. “Secularism and religion-making” (2013) 20:2 Democratization 378 at 378.
57. Cady & Hurd, supra note 54 at 6.
58. Radhika Gupta, Book Review of Rethinking Secularism by Craig Calhoun, Mark 
Juergensmeyer & Jonathan van Antwerpen, eds, (2013) 19:1 J Royal Anthropological 
Institute 204 at 205.

